Treading on Thin Ice

Samiksha, reporting from the Joint Crisis Committee- Inter-Services Intelligence (JCC-ISI), describes the debate in committee regarding the weakening of Indian Army Operations in the Siachen Glacier.

The Siachen Glacier is just northeast of the point where the Line of Control between India and Pakistan ends. Its geographical location gives it paramount importance concerning Indo-Pakistan disputes.

The Director of the Covert Action Division (CAD), emphasised on the importance of the weakening of the two main routes that are utilised to supply the Indian Army with their requirements, them being aerial and via land. The Director proposed to begin this operation by the implementation of the Landing Explosion, an operation that aims to create simultaneous explosions of the landing and lifting supply points from Kashmir to the Siachen Glacier. The primary supply route via road is National Highway 1. He also pointed out the repeated shelling of the Neelam Valley Road by India, proving this t be incentive to carry out the weakening of India’s supply land routes. This point was supplemented by the Director of the Joint Counter-Intelligence Bureau, who suggested that if roadways were being targeted, another line of action that can be adopted is measures adopted within truck drivers themselves, who are the primary players in supply routes, and to infiltrate the bureaucracy itself to divert all supplies meant for the Indian Army to Pakistan.

A different approach adopted by the Inspector General of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) was to occupy Tiger Hill using small troops. The delegate supported his argument by stating that this was to ensure that the Pakistani Military did not suffer heavy casualties and that they could build manpower upon respective bases. Upon retaliation by India, this approach would result in India incurring heavy losses. The delegate also urged the Technical Division to supply their troops with radio communication devices, considering the fact that communication can come to a complete standstill when military operations are underway. The NLI operatives would also be urged to communicate in Kashmiri languages to ensure that the military does not suspect them of being actors from the ISI.

A concern repeatedly brought out by various delegates such as the Director of Joint Intelligence X was about the Bofors Gun, a 40-millimetre anti-aircraft autocannon. This weapon is one of the advantages that the Indian Army has over Pakistan, and the delegate stressed how if used it could cause mass destruction and heavy casualties to Pakistan. The delegate emphasised on the importance of placing troops in the locations of the Bofors gun before the Landing Explosions Operation, to ensure defence. The Officer of the Federal Investigation Agency brought to light the fact that Pakistan has many intelligence agents who can collect information about the weapons in place, their positions, et cetera. However, the Inspector General of the NLI chose to counter these statements by stating that the presence of these guns is not a primary concern and should not stop the actions that the ISI plans to take. He also suggested the building of bunkers and providing soldiers with weapons such as grenades and missiles so that they can defend themselves in untimely positions.